This methodological essay describes and advocates using certain psychoanalytic techniques for ethnography. It focuses on the self analysis of the ethnographer using evenly hovering attention, dream analysis, and free association. It presents an argument that using those techniques enhances the goal of ethnography as a human science and of social research. Fear of crime serves as a point of departure for the methodological argument. Finally, it links psychoanalytic ethnography to a fractal model of society and the self with reference to C. S. Peirce's theory of semiotics as a link between the individual and society.
1. Introduction This is a methodological inquiry into reflexive ethnography. It explores a particular technique based on that in classical psychoanalysis. It treats research on fear of crime. In Britain and the United States fear of crime became a minor industry in social science research during the last decades of the twentieth century. For present purposes, fear of crime is not the object of study. It serves as a heuristic device for methodological disquisition. My essay is informed by Jennifer Hunt's study of Psychoanalytic Aspects of Fieldwork (1989) , but without any attribution of errors or misinterpretations to her.
In their methodological monograph, Wendy Hollway and Tony Jefferson (2000) advocated a life history approach to interviewing inform-ants about fear of crime. Further, they favored encouraging interviewees to free associate in the psychoanalytic manner. For their psychoanalytic foundation they built on the so-called Kleinian school derived from the work of Melanie Klein (1975 Klein ( , 1984 and others, especially WillfredBion (1967 WillfredBion ( , 1977 . This essay takes a different theoretical turn, or perhaps turns, as it diverges along several different paths.
First, this essay concentrates on the researcher instead of the informant. Second, it examines the material context of the interview, specifically the surrounding social milieu or neighborhood. Finally, it uses the classical psychoanalytic technique and its theoretical underpinning rather than the Kleinian approach. Classical psychoanalysis differs from the Kleinian, but also the French Lacanian, and American self psychology inaugurated by Heinz Kohut. All these psychoanalytic schools proclaim adherence to the theories and technical recommendations of Sigmund Freud. In Britain, the Kleinian school differed from the Freudian school, but the latter referred to followers of Anna Freud, not Sigmund Freud. Anna was Sigmund's daughter. With these differences, what remains the same is the examination of fear and idea of danger in a neighborhood setting.
Hollway and Jefferson used the life history interview to research fear of crime. Most of the findings by them and many other researches on the topic have focused on fear of crime in a neighborhood. The present proposal also focuses on fear inspiring neighborhoods, but advocates researchers to examine their own fear reactions. It is probably safe to say that most urban ethnographers are themselves urbanites. Doubtless many have relatively broad experience with urban settings. As such, they often know when they have entered a dangerous neighborhood, by what might be called intuition or instinct. Instead of submerging this reaction, one that has much affective content, I propose that researchers examine it as a principal source of data about the neighborhood in question. This introspection, self examination, or self analysis would be similar to what psychoanalysts do regarding their reactions to their analysands' discourses in analytic sessions.
Ethnographers' self examination serves as more than additional data; it can provide a corrective to the discourses of informants. For example, if an informant reports a continuous anxiety, heightened when outside his or her own abode, the ethnographer can use self examination to judge the accuracy of the informant's reportage. In short, the ethnographer uses introspection to judge whether the neighborhood is in fact dangerous, and opens inquiry into why informants think it is.
The introspective process is neither simple nor superficial. It requires an objective dissection of the ethnographer's reactions, some of which may be unconscious. Rather than writing them off as intuition, this kind of introspection assumes that there are objective reasons for the ethnographer's reactions, and requires that they be identified. An analogy is found in the research on kinesics by Ray L. Birdwhistell and his associates. They found that hundreds, possibly thousands, of communicative bits or cues passed between two people in an 18 second interchange. These communicative cues allowed the interaction to occur smoothly: that is, a man lighting a cigarette for a woman (Birdwhistell, 1970: 288-317) . Largely unconscious to the interlocutors, such cues not only enable short behavioral sequences, such as cigarette lighting; they also shape affective reactions to situations such as fear in a neighborhood. What the ethnographers must do is identify those cues in the surroundings that shape their fear reactions.
Psychoanalysis and Ethnography
In his 1912 paper on psychoanalytic technique, Sigmund Freud recommended that the analyst adopt an evenly hovering or evenly suspended attention. In effect, this attitude mirrors what the analyst and does in free association. It "simply consists in making no effort to concentrate on anything in particular and in maintaining in regard to all that one hears the same measure of calm, quiet attentiveness of 'evenly -hovering attention'" (Freud, 1912: 111) . The objective is for the analyst to "bend his own unconscious like a receptive organ towards the emerging unconscious of the patient" (Freud, 1912: 113) .
Ethnographic interviews and participant observer interaction differ, of course, from analytic sessions. Informants have not agreed to the analytic contract of free association, and ethnographers must attend far more consciously to their interactions. Even so, the kind of observation and analysis they pursue bear resemblance to the psychoanalytic encounter. In both, the ideal of evenly hovering attention can apply to perceptions of environments and situations. Indeed it would be difficult to attend to surrounding environments with studied attention, and at the same time carry on interviews and conversations with informants.
Psychoanalysis and ethnography touch at two other consequential points. Ethnographers, especially anthropologists in the United States, sought out psychoanalysis as an interpretive aid almost as soon as psychoanalysis gained notoriety from Freud's American lectures at Clark University in 1909. Leading anthropologists went into analysis and applied psychoanalytic insights to their field work. Hortense Powder maker (1966: 132-133 ) is but one, albeit revealing, example. Also, American ethnology often sought unconscious foundations for observed behavior including rituals, myths, and reported dreams exemplified by George Devereux, Alan Dundess, Weston La Barre, Géza Róheim, and others.
Sociology has less direct ties to psychoanalysis. Nonetheless, several sociologists have availed themselves of psychoanalytic training -for example, William Ogburn, Talcott Parsons, Jeffrey Prager, Nancy Chodorow, and Neil Smelser (Manning, 2005) . Recently, Jennifer C. Hunt (1989) advocated its use in sociological fieldwork. The early Chicago School sociologists went into the city of Chicago to experience and observe people in their social lives in such settings as saloons, department stores, tenements, and other places of leisure, employment, and abodes. Their work grew from the theoretical insights of Georg Simmel and George Herbert Mead, along with European social theorists.
Chicago School sociology and American Boasian anthropology used direct observation and the researchers' experiences of milieux to examine and report on the human condition. In most cases the ethnographic reports did not dwell on the researchers' self analysis, but neither do most case reports by psychoanalysts. The techniques of self analysis bore fruit in the final product, rarely in the reportage of the investigation, whether case reports or ethnographies. More recently, under the impact of what some methodologists put under the general rubric of postmodernism (Atkinson et al., 2003; Davies, 1999) , self examination and self disclosure appears increasingly in ethnographic publications. Researchers may or may not choose to make public the results of their self analysis, but the techniques themselves could be useful at any and all stages of the research process.
Techniques of Self Analysis
More specific than evenly hovering attention, researchers may use a number of techniques to examine their reactions to social milieux. Before discussing those specifics, a bit needs saying about their use in psychoanalysis.
Before psychoanalysis became institutionalized and bureaucratized, its methods did not involve years of training in institutes. Any intelligent person could use them. Sigmund Freud himself, as the first analyst, analyzed his own dreams and other psychological material. Subsequent analysts, the second generation, spent relatively short times in training analyses. Training analyses aimed at familiarizing the analyst with the workings of the unconscious. While today's lengthy and demanding training regimen might produce better analyses, the point is debatable. Nonetheless, ethnographers usually have no therapeutic aims, or if they do, they do not charge their informants for the privilege of being investigated. If therapeutic benefits accrue to informants, and some researchers have reported that result (Ortiz, 2001; Coles, 2002) , the goal remains social research, not individual treatment. Still, psychoanalysis and ethnography meet in a territory of difference (Churchill, 2007) . Moreover, and this may be the most important point, the kinds of unconscious forces examined in psychoanalysis obtain in any social situation. They need examining, and doing so adds to the fund of social scientific knowledge.
By way of illustration, I offer dream analysis as part of this ethnographic technique. Dreams remain the royal road to the unconscious. Freud described dream analysis in his Interpretation of Dreams (1900) . The procedure is simple. He adjured the dreamer to record the dream in writing, identify elements or sections of it, and then free associate to each of those elements, writing the associations as notes. Today, researchers can use a less restrictive tool. Instead of writing the dream, which by its nature potentiates much greater ego control and therefore censorship, ethnographers can use voice recorders to capture their own thoughts. Reviewing the recorded dream text and associations to it, the researcher can analyze their unconscious memories, fantasies, and ideas. Free association remains the hallmark of psychoanalytic technique as analysands free associate during their sessions. To free associate simply means to say whatever comes to mind, without the usual censorship so necessary for social civility. Self analysis of dreams as a regular part of field work inevitably draws on the field experiences as the day residue, the waking stimuli, for the dream. For example, walking alone in a neighborhood at night, approached by a stranger, might relate to dreams based on childhood fears of say primal scene observations, to use a classic psychoanalytic example. If the stranger on the street aroused anxiety, the researcher can better distinguish personal, childhood anxieties from realistic fears of possible assault.
The foregoing is a grossly over simplified example, of course. It merely illustrates the advantage of gaining access to unconscious ideas and memories that influence researchers. Once identified, those unconscious, largely infantile based reactions can be parsed from the researchers' own field experience narratives. Such infantile ideation is only one part of the unconscious material that grounds researchers' affective responses to field experiences. The other part comes from the social unconscious. Discriminating between the personal unconscious of the ethnographer and the social unconscious opens the way to a more realist or naturalist understanding of social conditions, which after all is the goal of ethnography and all social research (Bhaskar, 1979; Davies, 1999) .
Applications to Fear of Crime
Researchers' status as outsiders, albeit usually not naïve outsiders as they are in exotic social situations, aids their appreciation through the social unconscious. The social unconscious reflects the background of social milieux, the taken for granted mise-en-scène. Two ethnographies refer to neighborhood based crime fears. Sally Engle Merry investigated crime fear among residents of a low income housing project in the Boston metropolitan area in the mid 1970s (Merry, 1981) . Philippe Bourgois commented on the issue in his ethnography of crack dealers in East Harlem in the mid 1980s (Bourgois, 2002) . Both relied on versions of the social disorganization idea derived from Chicago School sociology. That is, urban fears and fear of crime specifically grow in conditions of relative social estrangement where neighbors are not positively connected. They may fear each other or at least believe they cannot rely on each other for solidarity and ultimately protection. Both also noted that fear of crime does not correlate with actual crime or violence. Merry worked in a comparatively low crime neighborhood. She observed that:
Contrary to frequent claims by researchers and law enforcement personnel, this study suggests that a moderate reduction in the crime rate will not reduce fear of crime. Only changes that alter the nature of relations between the small social worlds that constitute the city, that improve communication between these worlds, that refine cognitive categories, and that decrease anonymity will reduce the uncertainty urbanites feel in coping with individuals outside their own social enclave (Merry, 1981: 239-240) In contrast, Bourgois worked in an extremely high crime neighborhood with a high level of violence in which shootings, fire bombings, and severe beatings were not rare events and were visible. Nonetheless, Bourgois lived in the neighborhood for years with his wife and infant child, although she and the children departed leaving Philippe behind. Neither she nor the child ever experienced violence from other denizens of the neighborhood. Bourgois himself reported being mugged only once, when he and a number of other customers were in a convenience store robbery at 2 am (Bourgois, 2003: 33) . Bourgois compared the situation to what Michael Taussig (1987) characterized as a culture of terror with reference to Nazi Germany and colonial South America.
In contemporary Spanish Harlem one of the consequences of the culture of Terror" dynamic is to silence the peaceful majority of the population who reside in the neighborhood. They isolate themselves from the community and grow to hate those who participate in street culturesometimes internalizing racist stereotypes in the process. A profound ideological dynamic mandates distrust of one's neighbors. Conversely, mainstream society unconsciously uses the images of a culture of terror to dehumanize the victims and perpetrators and to justify its unwillingness to confront segregation, economic marginalization, and public sector breakdown (Bourgois, 2003: 34) .
Despite dangerous neighbors, Bourgois' main threats came from police who typically treated him as someone out of place -as dirt in Mary Douglas ' (1966) famous concept -specifically a White drug addict. Additionally, Bourgois' informants did not so much fear police as the risks of short term incarceration stemming from arrests for small amounts of drugs. The informants feared other inmates in New York's holding pens (Bourgois, 2003:37) . Bourgois sums up the problem: "Both criminals and police play by the rules of the culture of terror " (2003: 35) . Bourgois and Taussig's culture of terror is what I would attribute to ghettoization -the construction of communities of apartheid not unlike the ghettos the Nazis constructed in Poland, Lithuania and the conquered territories of their Drangnach Osten, the drive to the east. The objective for the Nazis was control, control of an undesirable population, Jews, and control of the Gentile majority of Poles, Lithuanians, and so on through a culture of terror (cf. Parenti, 2000; Wacquant, 1994 Wacquant, , 2008 . The difference between the Nazi ghettos and contemporary American ghettos is that the Nazis did not try to repress their goal of social control. In contrast, the structure, function, and origins of American ghettos remain largely occluded, repressed from social consciousness. Christian Parenti offered another perspective, arguing that crime itself operated as social control: "crime and fear of crime are forms of social control (. . .) these acts drive victims of capitalism, racism, and sexism into the arms of the racist, probusiness, sexist state. In short, crime justifies state violence and even creates popular demand for state repression " (2000: 44) .
Following the logic of Bourgois, Wacquant, and Parenti implies that the state plays a central, organizing role, along with other actors such as businesses and market interests generally, in producing social conditions that have earned the name 'ghettos'. Moreover, those ghettoized social conditions encourage certain kinds of interpersonal crime and fear of crime. With Merry's interpretation in mind, these repressed social and political forces also hide the process that weakens social bonds among neighbors and induces fear of them. The ethnographer's job is inter alia to undo the repression, and bring into social consciousness what has been repressed. Using the psychoanalytic techniques of evenly hovering attention coupled with self analysis aids in meeting the challenge.
Psychoanalysts match the relaxed ego controls entailed by free association with evenly hovering attention to engage their unconscious with that of analysands. Analysts also move back and forth between the somewhat regressed state and fully attentive ego engagement when they analyze the transference of the analysands and their own counter transference. Counter transference analysis corrects for the distortion of the analyst's own unconscious and thereby clarifies the transference so that analysts can offer useful interpretations. Ethnographers can do the same. As in the example given above where an ethnographer fears an approaching stranger, the personal part of the ethnographer's fear -the primal scene dream -becomes entangled with the social fear. The ethnographer's self analysis can disentangle unconscious motives for personal fears from socially unconscious motives for fears. That is, in this example, assume that fearing an approaching stranger is the social norm. The self analytic ethnographer is better able to investigate why it is the norm. What sorts of objective conditions underlie the norm? What culturally constrained and motivated signs and symbols index a fearful response?
Social Repression and Psychoanalysis
Hollway and Jefferson began their methodological argument with what should be an obvious starting point. "In researching any topic, there are two overarching questions that have to be addressed: what is the object of inquiry and howcan it be enquired into?" (2000: 7). The first question is a major stumbling block with respect to fear of crime, as they acknowledge. The problem is that the ontological status of fear of crime is shaky at best. Part of that shakiness derives from the ontological status of crime. On the one hand the affect, fear of crime, remains vague, but so does crime. The first is an abstract social affect; the second is an abstract social category. The connection between these two abstractions is not only vague, but may be downright imaginary.
Start with crime. Here are some crimes not usually included in the category, except by a few students and researchers: white collar crimes ranging from fraud to negligent homicide and crimes of the state including war crimes, false imprisonment, torture, and the like. Toxic waste dumping as in the Love Canal scandal or product defects as in the murderous design of Ford Pintos both could qualify as violent crimes that produced death, illness, and injury. But when asked about what crimes people fear, these do not even rate a category in survey research on fear of crime, and for good reason. Despite such claims about public sentiment, there is reason to believe that both the putative crime wave of the 1960s and fear of it came from inventive public relations campaigns and not objective conditions. That is, there was no crime wave, and people did not fear it. Dennis Loo has shown as false that "the prevailing view [that], the 'law 'n order issue originated within the public and precipitated a major shift in US public policy." Instead, Loo argued that" (. . .) the consensus about crime fear "lacked a genuine popular component. It was, rather, the representation of a popular consensus" (2009: 12-13). Moreover, as a number of scholars have shown, there was no rise in street crimes in the period. That too was manufactured. The fear of crime was not fear of interpersonal assault, but fear of social unrest mainly civil rights and anti-war movements (Beckett, 1997; Beckett, and Sasson, 2004; Rosch, 1985; Skoll, 2009 Skoll, , 2010 .
All this history of crime and fears of it could be simplified, or even written off, as just an example of the Thomas theorem: "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (Thomas,and Thomas, 1928: 572) . Could be, were it not for the many layers of repression at every step, even about the Thomas theorem itself. Robert Merton found two instances of repression. First, the theorem is attributed to only one Thomas, William I., and not to him and his wife, Dorothy Swain. Second, Merton noted the fate of its negative corollary.
In his lecture course at the University of Chicago, W.I. Thomas's colleague George H. Mead had observed in distinctly sociological terms that "If a thing is not recognized as true, then it does not function as true in the community." But the Thomas theorem and the Mead theorem experienced notably different cognitive fates. In virtually self-exemplifying style, the Mead theorem dropped into permanent oblivion even after its posthumous transition from "oral publication" in lectures to publication in print (Mead, 1936:29) . Not so with the Thomas theorem (Merton, 1995: 383) .
To complicate matters even more, the question about the Thomas theorem -namely, why do people believe in imaginary things of their own invention? -gets coupled with the 'effects' part of the theorem. Why should people act in accordance with imaginary things. This problem has two relevant discussants -Freud and Nietzsche -and of course their pairing is not happenstance. Begin with Freud. His great discoveries linking dreams and neuroses depend on a still highly controversial notion: imagined, wished for, or fantasized memories have the same psychic effect as real ones. Hence, the symptoms of hysterical neuroses could come from real seductions or those that are imagined. Previously, Nietzsche weighed in. Richard Shweder wrote that Nietzsche offered an aphorism by way of explanation for neurotic symptoms and other behavior. "Nietzsche's answer to the question is given in one of his famous aphorisms: 'being moral means being highly accessible to fear'" (Shweder, 1992: 45) . Shweder elucidated on what he termed Nietzsche's null reference argument about God, witches, and other imaginary objects. What we know by science are things we experience through our senses. "The rest is miscarriage and not-yet-science -in other words, metaphysics, theology, psychology, epistemology -or formal science, a doctrine of signs such as logic and that applied logic which is called mathematics. In them reality is represented not at all (. . .)" (Shweder, 1992 : 48 quoting Nietzsche 1878 . Shweder was troubled by what he saw as a disjuncture. How could the content of not discerned objects, that is, mental objects, affect discernible behavior? His answer was that "The terms and concepts [mental objects] we use to describe the world take account of our needs and desires" (1992: 56). Accordingly, and in agreement with Freud, the effect of fantasies is the same as the effect of real events, at least in what Freud termed the primary process, the wish dominated, largely unconscious part of human beings.
Integrated Model of Repression
These insights combine with social forces. In psychoanalysis analysands seek to undo repression to gain greater conscious control of their lives through liberation from unconscious impulses. The analysts assist by helping them to overcome their own unconscious resistance against the analytic process. Those resistances come from fear, fear of what analysis might reveal about them. Fears embed themselves in human psyches largely because those fears take root in infantile experiences and understandings of the world.
Just as a part of every analysand fears analysis and resists it, mature adults in contemporary societies fear losing the securities of hierarchical control. It is safer to keep things as they are. It is safer not to know how elites control people to extract wealth. It is safer not to take responsibility for their own lives but to hand it over to someone else whom they can blame if things go wrong. Wilhelm Reich (1946) and Erich Fromm (1941 , 1980 made parallel points in describing the populist acceptance and complicity in Nazism. Resistance in psychoanalysis remains mostly a personal, individual matter. Unconscious fears, memories, and fantasies at the individual level manifest at the societal level as concerted and deliberate manipulation through hegemonic control.
Investigations about the belief that Saddam Hussein was involved in the 9/11 attacks revealed the social psychological mechanism of inferred justification. Inferred justification is a form of motivated reasoning, a form of cognitive dissonance theory (Prasad et at., 2009, citing Festinger, and Carlsmith, 1959) . At the societal level, forces arrayed against freedom and equality do not operate from infantile motives or ego defenses. Their motives are wealth and power. The analogy between psychoanalytically defined repression and societal level political repression is not just simile or metaphor. Despite psychoanalytic concentration on the personal and psychological, much if not all psychological repression finds reinforcement and often even its origins in massive, orchestrated social, cultural, and political repression.
Apparatuses of the state spearhead social repression. A case study of a drug abuse treatment center for criminalized adults revealed the process. The center dealt with impoverished and criminalized drug addicts in a long-term, residential setting. Coffee drinking practices illustrate the mechanism of repression in that social micro-system. The administration of the facility repressed the drug aspects of coffee and the fact that the residents paid for the coffee through their food stamps. They repressed the economic and pharmacological facts by forbidding them from con-versation. As Freud (1923) explained, consciousness relies on putting thoughts into words. Without verbalization, they remain unconscious. When forces, psychological or political, forbid verbalization, the thoughts enter the dynamic unconscious -that is, they are repressed.
Repression of the economic facts of food stamps is effective because it is associated with repressing the drug attribute of coffee, and both of these aspects of coffee are associated with the overall economic, political, and legal oppression of the residents. Moreover, by breaking coffeedrinking rules, residents become subject to demotion in the status hierarchy, and thus affirm the imposed micro-social structure. The net effect of the repressions, displacements, and even oppositions is to support the pattern of power relations within this social establishment. Furthermore, the very existence of the institution supports the oppression of the residents, who are members of the underclass in the wider society (Skoll, 1991: 7) .
A popular folksong exemplifies the same principle in a far wider setting. Woody Guthrie wrote This Land Is Your Land in 1940 as a rebellious answer to Irving Berlin's God Bless America. Although most people know, or at least have heard the first few verses, they remain ignorant of the song's most pithy lyrics. Usually omitted from performances are the following:
There was a big high wall there that tried to stop me; Sign was painted, it said -private property; But on the back side it didn't say nothing; That side was made for you and me.
Nobody living can ever stop me, As I go walking that freedom highway; Nobody living can ever make me turn back This land was made for you and me.
In the squares of the city, In the shadow of a steeple; By the relief office, I'd seen my people. As they stood there hungry, I stood there asking, Is this land made for you and me? (Partridge, 2002: 85) .
Bruce Springsteen and Pete Seeger performed the more complete version at Barack Obama's inauguration. Subsequent events have shown this return of the repressed as nothing more than cooptative showmanship by Barack Obama, a master manipulator, a "star of decision" in Guy Debord's terms (1967: 39) . In the end, most people still do not know; much less care about the significance of the most poignant lyrics.
In keeping with a fractal view of social structure, discussed below; patterns of repression, oppression, and hegemonic ideological control in social micro-systems such as the drug treatment center replicate patterns within US society, and ultimately at a global level. The observations of the drug center took place in the mid-1980s at the height of the war on drugs under the Reagan regime. The practices of the drug center carry out hegemonic patterns on individuals, mainly the residents, but also the staff. Micro-social control through repression replicates and effectuates control exerted through courts, penal systems, and welfare agencies. The center helps ensure conformity with the pharmaceutical industry that relies on such facilities and attendant legal and welfare policies to regulate the drug market. At the highest level, facilities such as this one are part of US policies that use the international drug trade to facilitate foreign policy. In the end, social control has to employ means to control individuals, but that control always follows systemic patterns, and always serves interests of the ruling class.
Self-Analysis and Ethnography
In addition to dream analysis, the ethnographic process has other moments that lend themselves to self-analysis by ethnographic researchers. Most researchers record their observations and reactions in a journal. Whatever the particular method, whether bound notebooks, laptop computers, or voice recordings; the recording process can function almost like a session of free association. The researcher may slip into a kind of reverie similar to that of evenly hovering attention. The text of the journal record can serve the same function as the text of a recalled dream, discussed above. It may also include a series of free associations, which in turn provide more grist for the analytic mill. These daily recordings, therefore, do not just record the scientific, ethnographic self, but the personal with all its unconscious wishes, fantasies, desires, and fears albeit in relative disguise -just like the text and imagery of a recalled dream. Also just like the ethnographer's own dreams, the journal, or more exactly, the process of recording in the journal, can reveal the ethnographer's counter-transference, the personal and mainly unconscious distortions of observations. At the same time, the journal recordings can illuminate unnoticed parts of the social unconscious, perhaps those that the ethnographer glossed over because of counter-transference.
Journal recordings generally consist of three types: recordings of informants' conversations, recordings of observed behavior and milieus, and the ethnographers' reactions to the former two. Compare that to psychoanalysts' observational technique. As two training analysts, Jacob Spencer and Leon Balter explain, psychoanalysts rely on two types of observations that are common in all the human sciences: introspective observation and behavioral observation. Psychoanalysts operate within a framework of psychic determinism -meaning that psychological and behavioral phenomena are caused -and the assumption that unconscious mental processes exert dynamic effects of on ideas, feelings, and behavior. Most importantly," (...)the patient's free association and the analyst's evenly suspended attention exert an ongoing influence on what psychoanalysts are able to observe; they function together as an instrument which extends the observed field in a unique manner " (1990: 397) . Spencer and Balter go on to stress that analysts observe and analyze not just the analysands' discourses and the analysts reactions to them, but also the observed behavior in the analytic situation -the equivalent of the ethnographer's observations of social milieux. Therefore, ethnographers can use their journal recordings to inform both empathy and observation; they can use them to explore their own countertransference to the field work experience, and they can use them to disentangle their personal unconscious from the social unconscious of the field work milieux.
While almost all ethnographers keep journals, some also produce what might be called artistic or creative works -fiction, paintings, sculptures, music, and so on. Ethnographic journals and the self-analytic uses to which they may be put also differ from a recently popular ethnographic genre, auto ethnography. Despite their differences, all these forms can be subject to and benefit from self-analysis. Here, I am painting with a wide brush. For instance, the technique of ethnographic self-analysis overlaps with the methodological concept of crystallization. Briefly, crystallization is a term coined by Laurel Richardson (2000) and explored by Laura Ellingson (2009), among others. Crystallization uses the processes of writing, painting, composing music and similar creative activities as products leading to understanding. They bear a functional similarity to a remembered dream. By crystallizing, putting one's experiences, feelings, thoughts, and so on into words, pictures, or sounds can lead to greater understanding as the process actually crystallizes what ethnographers have learned through research. In general agreement with that notion, self-analysis applies a particular way of gaining the knowledge through the crystallizations.
Analyzing such creative products serves a dual role, because of the way they are produced. They are produced by a person, the ethnographer, and they are produced by a particular, enculturated member of a society -also the ethnographer. Weston La Barre critiqued what certainly qualifies as abstracted empiricism (Mills, 1959) .The researcher sets out to collect his data (...) next he brings heaps of protocols, puts them on punch cards, and lays them at the foot of the Truth Machine untouched by human mind. Finally, he pushes a button and science emerges. (...) But he does not seem to realize that his results have already been programmed by a far more sophisticated (or sophistic) computer, his mind -the unexamined, motivated, enculturated, time-serving human mind. (LaBarre, 1978: 260) Recognizing the programming by the ethnographer, analyzing it, separating the personal unconscious from the social unconscious permits a more realistic ethnographic text.
The ethnographers' crystallizations provide embodiment by giving material form, and this applies to words on a page as much as paint on a canvas or sound waves moving through air interpreted as musical notes and other such aural phenomena. Once materialized, they contain the personal unconscious of ethnographers and the social unconscious of their milieux. Pertinently, they are susceptible to analysis, both the kind of analysis proffered by literature and art critics -that is, cultural criticism -but also psychoanalytic self-analysis by the ethnographers them-selves. A further gain resides in such materialized products. Tapping into a current social unconscious, the arts represent social trends even as they contribute to shaping them. Historically, the arts have represented social trends before sociological discourses have reported them (Best, andKellner, 1997 citing Shlain, 1991 Jameson, 1981 Methodology should relate to theories about its subject matter. In the present case, an intrapsychic method and its theories stemming from psychoanalysis are applied to sociological studies, particularly those on fear of crime. The political scientist Wesley Skogan described fear of crime as an intrapsychic, subjective phenomenon: "(...) a diffuse psychological construct affected by a number of aspects of urban life" (Skogan, 1976: 14 quoted in Lee, 2009: 33) . Skogan subsequently studied some of those aspects of urban life and their relation to public policies (Skogan, 1990; Skogan, and Maxfield, 1981) . Nonetheless, fear of crime had already become a social, political, and public policy phenomenon by 1968 (Harris, 1969) . Two problems arise. First, how do intrapsychic phenomena become social and vice versa? Second, how can one method of study designed for the intrapsychic serve social inquiry, and also vice versa? At a theoretical level, the questions find their problematization in Talcott Parsons' structural social theories according to Niklas Luhmann (1982: 47-68) . Philip Manning recounted Luhmann's critique by arguing that Parson's four system model of the social, the cultural, the personality, and the behavioral organism interpenetrate and are interdependent in a way to produce analytic infinite regress (Manning, 2005: 108) . More empirically, George Devereux (1961) noted the phenomenon of the intrapsychic and social, the micro and macro sociological in his report about refugees from the 1956 Hungarian revolt. He found that those who participated in the revolt, a wide spread social movement, had a variety of personal motives for joining, many of which were unrelated to the movement's political aims. Nevertheless, they engaged in communal action.
One solution to the conundrum combines the mathematical model of fractals with the semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce. Fractals are forms with the same structural pattern regardless of their size. For example, a one-meter stretch of the coastline of Britain has the same structure as the coast's entire length. Benoit Mandelbrot (1982) discovered the mathematical description of fractals originally in 1960 -about the same time Edward N. Lorenz (1963) discovered attractors in non-linear systems. Mandelbrot found recurring patterns at every scale in data on cotton prices. In 1967, Mandelbrot showed that a coastline's length varies with the scale of the measuring instrument, resembles itself at all scales, and is infinite in length for an infinitesimally small measuring device. An object whose irregularity is constant over different scales, "self-similarity," is a fractal. Fractal theory contributes to chaos theory in showing the replication of small variations according to regularities or structural patterns. The mechanisms by which the different levels of coastlines, cotton markets, or societies recursively show similar patterns at every level are signs. Peircean semiotics does not require consciousness, in contrast to Saussure's semiology, and it does not even require the assumption of living organisms. Signs interpenetrate and are interdependent across multiple systems carrying and creating information with the potential of organizing system dynamics (Deledalle, 2000; Sebeok, 1991) .
By assuming society has fractal patterns, one would expect to find recursive patterning in repression at the intrapsychic level and every higher level of abstraction studied by the human sciences. The same applies to emotional patterns of fear. Therefore, fear of crime shows fractal patterning at every level, from the intrapsychic to the societal. And, it shows the same fractal patterning of the reasons for the fear at every level, although the motivations for the fear may differ at each level. Hence, Skogan's intrapsychic phenomenon has the same structural pattern as the phenomenon between individuals and in small groups like families (the micro social) through neighborhoods to the whole of American society (the macro social). Therefore, psychoanalytic techniques applied in ethnographic studies can capture the recursive patterns.
